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Abstract
We propose a generic method for solving infinite-horizon, discrete-time dynamic incen-
tive problems with hidden states. We first combine set-valued dynamic programming tech-
niques with Bayesian Gaussian mixture models to determine irregularly shaped equilib-
rium value correspondences. Second, we generate training data from those pre-computed
feasible sets to recursively solve the dynamic incentive problem by a massively parallelized
Gaussian process machine learning algorithm. This combination enables us to analyze
models of a complexity that was previously considered to be intractable. To demonstrate
the broad applicability of our framework, we compute solutions for models of repeated
agency with history dependence, many types, and varying preferences.
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1 Introduction
Dynamic incentive (DI) problems are of key importance in model-based economics. They occur
whenever two parties form a contract with asymmetric information, and encompass questions
such as manager remuneration, insurance contracts, and optimal taxation (see, e.g., Golosov et
al., (2016a) and references therein for a thorough review). Solving these models is a formidable
task, as standard recursive techniques (see, e.g., Stokey et al., (1989)) are often not directly
applicable. To this end, previous research both into discrete-time1 and into continuous-time
settings2 extensively studied methods, in various contexts, of recursively representing incentive-
compatible contracts in order to make them formally tractable. There are two types of obstacle
that arise in these models in general. First, unobservable continuous actions lead to incentive
constraints that are are themselves optimization problems. In the literature, they are com-
monly referred to as moral hazard problems. Second, in so-called adverse selection problems,
unobserved discrete states make it necessary to look at a high-dimensional dynamic program
with an unknown domain.
In this paper, we present a novel, generic method for dealing with DI problems. In partic-
ular, we focus on solving infinite-horizon, discrete-time DI models with hidden states and with
shocks that follow a Markov chain. Two major bottlenecks create substantial difficulties in solv-
ing such dynamic adverse selection problems3 numerically, namely, (i) the determination and
approximation of (possibly) high-dimensional and non-convex equilibrium correspondences—
that is, feasible sets of a dynamic program, and (ii) performing dynamic programming on them.
Thus, we also have to repeatedly and efficiently approximate functions on irregularly shaped
domains. To the best of our knowledge, there exists at present no solution framework in the
DI context that can cope with all these issues at once.
Complication (i) is a standard issue in models with repeated agency, since they require
full history dependence (see Lambert, (1983) and Rogerson, (1985)). This, in turn, leads
to time-inconsistent dynamic programs. A way of dealing with this issue is to introduce
promised utilities as a bookkeeping mechanism, which has led to several recursive formulations
for various types of hidden information (see, e.g., Spear and Srivastava, (1987), Fernandes and
Phelan, (2000), and Doepke and Townsend, (2006)). Once models with history dependence
are written in a recursive form, the set of feasible utility vectors is not known in advance
and can be of irregular—that is, non-hypercubic geometry. As complication (ii), a curse of
dimensionality (Bellman, 1961) arises in dynamic adverse selection problems, since for every
individual type of agent, the dimensionality of the state space increases. Hence, if standard,
Cartesian grid-based algorithms are applied in the solution process, the computational effort as
well as the storage requirements grow exponentially and render even models of only moderate
complexity computationally infeasible. The existing literature, therefore, is limited to at most
two-dimensional models (see, e.g., Broer et al., (2017), Doepke and Townsend, (2006), and
Abraham and Pavoni, (2008)), as in them the curse of dimensionality is avoided from the
outset, which can be suboptimal with regard to the ideal choice of model.
We propose to tackle (i) by pre-computing the time-invariant feasible set for the continu-
1For an incomplete list of references, see, e.g., Spear and Srivastava, (1987), Fernandes and Phelan, (2000),
Cole and Kocherlakota, (2001), Werning, (2002), Doepke and Townsend, (2006), Abraham and Pavoni, (2008),
and Pavoni et al., (2017).
2See, e.g., DeMarzo and Sannikov, (2006), Sannikov, (2008), Williams, (2009, 2011), and He et al., (2017),
among others.
3Note that while the focus of the work presented lies on solving dynamic adverse selection problems, the
method proposed here has a far broader scope: it can also be applied, for example, to moral hazard problems
or to dynamic games, where one of the major difficulties also lies in finding the equilibrium sets. For discrete
actions and lotteries over payoffs, they are convex. However, for other assumptions they are not, which demands
a more general approach such as the one proposed in this paper.
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ous state variables by combining ideas from Abreu et al., (1986, 1990) (henceforth APS4) with
Bayesian Gaussian mixture models (BGMMs) (see, e.g., Rasmussen, (2000)). Next, we deal
with (ii) by solving the recursively formulated DI problem on an irregularly shaped domain
by applying a massively parallelized dynamic programming (DP) algorithm that uses Gaus-
sian process regression (GPR) to approximate high-dimensional value and policy functions
(see Scheidegger and Bilionis, (2017), and references therein) on the entire feasible set. This
combination enables us to analyze DI models that were previously considered to be intractable.
The seminal work by APS introduced a constructive procedure for computing feasible sets.
In particular, the authors showed that there exists a set-valued contraction mapping whose fixed
point is the feasible set. In practical applications we therefore have to repeatedly approximate
potentially non-convex equilibrium correspondences. To do so, we apply BGMMs to construct
a classifier5 (see, e.g., Murphy, (2012)) to divide the computational domain into a feasible and
an infeasible region. This classification then leads to an outer approximation that iteratively
shrinks toward the feasible set. We terminate the iteration once two successive classifiers
become sufficiently close. Our approach has several desirable features. First, since sampling
achieves the approximation of feasible sets through BGMMs, it does not directly suffer from
the curse of dimensionality and thus can deal with problems involving many types. Second,
the numerical approximation of the feasible set is independent of solving the DI problem and
thus does not directly add to the computational complexity. Third, it can approximate both
convex and non-convex sets. Thus, the work presented here is a substantial improvement on
the previous literature. Judd et al., (2003) and Yeltekin et al., (2017), for example, provide
a numerical scheme for determining the feasible sets of discrete state supergames by using
polygons. Their approach however relies on the convexification of the payoff set and suffers
from the curse of dimensionality. Similarly, Sleet and Yeltekin, (2016) provide an extension
to this method for the case of continuous state variables, but their extension suffers from the
same issues.
After pre-computing the feasible sets, we have to solve the recursively formulated dynamic
adverse selection model on the irregularly shaped domains. For this purpose, we apply a
massively parallelized discrete-time DP algorithm that uses GPR in order to approximate the
value and policy functions. GPR is a form of supervised machine learning (see, e.g., Rasmussen
and Williams, (2005) and Murphy, (2012), and references therein) and has successfully been
applied to a variety of applications in data science, engineering, and other fields to perform
approximation and classification tasks. In economics, Scheidegger and Bilionis, (2017) recently
applied Gaussian processes (GPs) to solve very-high-dimensional dynamic stochastic models as
well as to perform uncertainty quantification. A defining feature of GPs is that they combine
the best of two worlds—namely, those of grid-free methods such as Monte Carlo (MC) (see,
e.g., Press et al., (2007), and references therein) and of smooth function approximation theory.
GPs learn a function based on the observations available at so-called design points, and do
so without any geometric restriction. Moreover, since the construction of GP surrogates6 is
achieved by sampling from a domain of interest such as a feasible set, they do not directly
suffer from the curse of dimensionality as do Cartesian grid-based algorithms. GPs, therefore,
stand in stark contrast to ordinary, grid-based approximation schemes for continuous, high-
dimensional state spaces such as Smolyak’s method (see, e.g., Malin et al., (2010) and Judd et
al., (2014)), adaptive sparse grids (see, e.g., Brumm and Scheidegger, (2017)), high-dimensional
model reduction (see Eftekhari et al., (2017)), or projection methods (see, e.g., Judd, (1992)).
4For the remainder of this paper, APS is used to refer both to Abreu et al., (1986, 1990) and to the method
introduced by these authors.
5Note that in the machine learning literature, classification can—loosely speaking—be considered to be the
problem of identifying to which of a set of categories a new data observation belongs.
6We use the terms “interpolator” and “surrogate” interchangeably.
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Those grid-based approximators are restricted to hyper-rectangular state spaces and thus are
not a natural modeling choice in the context of solving dynamic adverse selection models.
To demonstrate the capabilities of the framework proposed in this paper, we solve a dynamic
adverse selection model similar to those discussed, for example, in Fernandes and Phelan,
(2000) and Broer et al., (2017). It consists of a risk-averse agent who has unobserved income
shocks, and a risk-neutral planner who wants to provide optimal incentive-compatible insurance
against income shocks. The agent reports his income shock to the principal, who then transfers
consumption or charges a fee to the agent dependent on the reported shock. Since the principal
can only see the reports, the observed shock process is fully history dependent.7 The reason
for this history dependence is that the principal has to condition his actions with respect to
the agent’s reports and not with respect to the actual shocks. While this model is relatively
easy to explain, its dimensionality and complexity can be scaled up in a straightforward and
meaningful way, as they just depend linearly on the number of types considered. This feature
of the model allows us to focus on the problem of handling irregularly shaped, high-dimensional
state spaces in the DI context. Note that much of the existing literature has focused on the
stylized analysis of such contracts rather than on their numerical implementation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we specify the baseline
DI environment we are targeting with our framework. In Section 3, we outline the solution
method. We first discuss how we construct an APS-style algorithm by using BGMMs; then,
we provide a short review of DP and summarize the workings of GP machine learning. Finally,
we show how to embed APS and BGMMs into a massively parallel DP algorithm that is based
on GPR. In Section 4, we discuss the performance of our method via a variety of illustrative
test cases. Section 5 concludes.
2 A baseline dynamic incentive model
To demonstrate the scalability and flexibility of the method we introduce in this paper, we
consider an infinitely repeated, dynamic adverse selection problem in discrete time as described
in Fernandes and Phelan, (2000).8
Time is indexed by t = 1, 2, . . . ∈ N. In every period t, an agent observes his9 taste shock
θt ∈ Θ, where Θ is a finite set of cardinality N . He then reports his shock to the principal.
Subsequently, the principal offers a contract ct, which depends on the entire history of reports,
to the agent. Since we need to keep track of the history of types (see Fernandes and Phelan,
(2000)), we define the type history at time t to be the (t)-tuple—that is, an ordered list
ht = (θ0, θ1, . . . , θt−1) for t ≥ 1. Next, we define the set of possible histories at time t by
Ht = Θt = Θ × Θ × . . . × Θ and set h1 ∈ Θ to be the initial history at time 1. We assume
without loss of generality that the initial history is public knowledge. An optimal solution
to the problem is a transfer scheme that maximizes the principal’s utility while delivering a
predetermined lifetime utility to the agent. This scheme will be a sequence of conditional
transfers that depend on all past realizations of types. Furthermore, we impose the following
assumptions on the primitives of the model:
Assumption 1.
1. The set of types Θ = {1, . . . , N} is of cardinality N ∈ N.
2. The set C ⊂ R of compensations is a non-empty and compact interval.
7Previous research suggests that private information in the economic environments we are interested in is
highly persistent (see, e.g., Meghir and Pistaferri, (2004)).
8We follow the formalism of Golosov et al., (2016a) to describe the model.
9In this paper, for the sake of brevity, both the agent and the principal are male.
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3. The transition probabilities pi(θt|θt−1) are defined by a probability matrix Π ∈ RN×N .
4. The principal’s utility function is given by v : C×Θ→ R and the agent’s utility function
by u : C ×Θ→ R. They are both twice continuously differentiable in C.
5. The principal and the agent have a common discount factor β ∈ (0, 1).10




(ht, i)|ht) = Πθt−1,i, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N} (1)




) |ht) = Πθt−1,i · µ (ht+τ−1|ht) . (2)
The principal’s compensation strategy is a function of the history of reports up to period t.
His strategy, therefore, is a function ct : H
t → C. We denote the principal’s infinite horizon
strategies by the sequences of strategy functions c = (c1, c2, . . .).
At time t, the agent has to decide what to report to the principal; his strategy is, thus a
function on the domain Ht—that is, at : H























where Xt is a random variable with values in Θ and distribution pi. We can get rid of the
reporting strategy of the agent by applying the following theorem:
Theorem 1 (Revelation principle). (Golosov et al., 2016a, Th. 1) For every contract c and
incentive compatible strategy aˆ, there is a cˆ with the same payoff to the principal such that
truth-telling is incentive compatible.
The revelation principle allows us to only look at compensation schemes that induce truth-
telling and thus to define the dynamic adverse selection problem. Given an initial history












































, ∀θ ∈ Θ. (6)
As a next step, we simplify the incentive constraints by applying a classic theorem.
Theorem 2 (One-shot deviation principle). (Golosov et al., 2016a, Lem. 3) The incentive



















 , ∀s ∈ N,∀a : Θ→ Θ. (7)
10This last assumption, while being standard, is not necessary for our computational framework.
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Figure 1: The sequence of events in period t.
Note that in the one-shot deviation constraint (see Eq. (7)) we do not allow for all reporting
strategies. Instead, only strategies that remain feasible for the agent are admissible. As
a concrete example, assume that an agent over-reports his income when filling out his tax
declaration. In such a case, he would be charged income tax that he might be unable to pay.
All such reports are excluded from Eq. (7).
However, even after all these simplifications the dynamic adverse selection problem is still
unsolvable in its present form. To address this, we follow Fernandes and Phelan, (2000) and
introduce the utility promise wθ as a continuous state variable.
Theorem 3. (Golosov et al., 2016a, Eqs. (44–47)) There exists W (θ) ⊂ RN , the feasible sets
of utility promises for type θ, such that the problem defined by Eqs. 4,6, and 7 can be written
recursively as











Πν,θ˜(u(cθ˜, θ˜) + βw
+
θ˜,θ˜
) ∀ν ∈ Θ,
u(cθ˜, θ˜) + βw
+
θ˜,θ˜
≥ u(cν , θ˜) + βw+ν,θ˜ ∀θ˜ ∈ Θ, ∀ν ∈ Θ \ {θ˜},
c ∈ [0, c]N ,
w+
θ˜




)ν ∀θ˜ ∈ Θ, ∀ν ∈ Θ.
Note that we arranged w+ as an N × N matrix where the θ-th row of the matrix represents
next period’s utility promise conditional that θ happens. The first constraint is called promise
keeping constraint. It ensures that the principal follows up on his utility promises w+θ . The
second constraint is the truth telling constraint.
This measure allows us at the same time to keep track of the full history and to obtain
a recursive formulation. The latter point is critical in making the model tractable for the
computational method we propose in Sec. 3. Fig. 1 depicts the timeline for the recursively
formulated problem. At period t, the principal “learns” last period’s report θ and the utility
promises w. He then offers the agent a consumption menu c for each possible report, which
satisfy the truth-telling and promise-keeping constraints. Next, the agent chooses the truth-
telling reporting strategy. Finally, the shock θtrue is realized, the agent reports θ˜ according to
his strategy, and both the principal and the agent receive their respective utilities, v(cθ˜, θ˜) and
u(cθ˜, θtrue).
3 Dynamic programming on irregularly shaped domains
Solving dynamic adverse selection models as described in Sec. 2 numerically is a formidable
task, since we have to deal with a variety of complex issues at the same time: i) The feasible sets
W (θ) ⊂ RN of utility promises for type θ are not known in advance and have to be determined
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numerically (see Theorem 3). In most of the interesting cases, such sets have a non-trivial—that
is, a non–hypercubic geometry (see, e.g., Fernandes and Phelan, (2000), Broer et al., (2017)).
ii) For solving a DI problem recursively, for example with value function iteration (VFI; see,
e.g., Judd, (1998) and Ljungqvist and Sargent, (2000)), we need to repeatedly approximate and
evaluate high-dimensional functions at arbitrary coordinates within domains of interest—that
is to say, the irregularly shaped feasible sets. To meet all these challenging modeling demands
we therefore apply set-valued dynamic programming techniques in combination with BGMMs
to determine irregularly shaped equilibrium value correspondences. Subsequently, we use a
massively parallel VFI algorithm that applies GPR in each iteration step to learn the value
function and, if needed, the policy functions on the pre-computed, time-invariant feasible sets
globally.11
In this section we therefore proceed in four steps. In Sec. 3.1, we characterize the general
structure of the models we aim to solve by DP. In Sec. 3.2, we present a novel way of efficiently
computing equilibrium correspondences by combining ideas from Abreu et al., (1986, 1990)
with BGMMs (see Rasmussen, (2000)). Subsequently, we summarize–in Sec. 3.3–how value
and policy functions can be approximated by GP machine learning. Sec. 3.4 finally combines
all these components into a generic VFI framework for DI problems.
3.1 Background on dynamic programming
Throughout this paper, the abstract class of models we consider are discrete-time, infinite-
horizon stochastic optimal decision-making problems. Following Scheidegger and Bilionis,
(2017), we briefly characterize them here by the following general description: let xt ∈W ⊂ Rdx
denote the state of the economy at time t ∈ N+ of dimensionality dx ∈ N. Controls (actions)
are represented by a policy function c : W → ζ, where ζ is the space of possible controls. The
discrete-time transition function of the economy from one period to the next is given by the
distribution of xt+1, which depends on the current state and policies
xt+1 ∼ f (·|xt, c(xt)) . (9)
The transition function f that stochastically maps a state-action pair to a successor state
is assumed to be given, whereas the policy function c needs to be determined from equilib-
rium or optimality conditions. The standard way to do so is to use DP (see, e.g., Bellman,
(1961), Stokey et al., (1989), Judd, (1998), Ljungqvist and Sargent, (2000)), where the task
is to find an infinite sequence of controls {χt}∞t=0 to maximize the value function






for an initial state x0 ∈ W , r(·, ·) is the so-called return function, and χt ∈ Γ(xt) with Γ(xt)
being the set of feasible choices given xt. The discount factor β ∈ (0, 1) weights future returns.
DP seeks a time-invariant policy function c mapping the state xt into the action χt, such that
for all t ∈ N
χt = c(xt) ∈ Γ(xt), (11)
11Below, we follow Brumm and Scheidegger, (2017) and use the term “global solution” for a solution that
is computed using equilibrium conditions at many points in the state space of a dynamic model—in contrast
to a “local solution”, which rests on a local approximation around a steady state of the model. For a method
that computes such a global solution, we use the term “global solution method”. This use of the word “global”
is not to be confused with its use in the phrase “global optimization method”, which refers to a method that
aims to find a global optimum.
7
and {χt}∞t=0 solves the original problem. The principle of optimality states that we can find
such a solution by solving the Bellman equation
V (x) = max
χ
{r(x, χ) + βE [V (x˜)]}, (12)
where the successor state is distributed as x˜ ∼ f (·|x, χ). The solution is a fixed point of the
Bellman operator T , defined by
(TV )(x) = max
χ
{r(x, χ) + βE [V (x˜)]}. (13)
Under appropriate conditions (see, e.g., Stokey et al., (1989)) the Bellman operator is a con-
traction mapping. In this case, iteratively applying T provides a sequence of value functions
that converges to a unique fixed point. This procedure is called value function iteration (see,
e.g. Bertsekas, (2000), Judd, (1998), or Ljungqvist and Sargent, (2000)) and is motivated
by this theoretical justification and numerically implements the iterative application of the
Bellman operator to successive approximations of the value function. The corresponding DP
recursion thus starts from any bounded and continuous guess for the value function, and the
solution is approached in the limit as j →∞ by iterations on
Vj+1(x) = T (Vj)(x) := max
χj+1
{r(x, c) + βE [Vj(x˜)]}. (14)
In practice, we say that VFI has converged if numerical convergence in some norm, for example
‖Vτ − Vτ−1‖2 ≤ ,  ∈ R+, (15)
and some at some iteration step τ , is reached. The (approximate) equilibrium value function
shall be denoted as V∗ = Vτ and the corresponding policy functions as χ∗ = χτ . From Eq. (14),
it becomes apparent that we need to repeatedly approximate and evaluate (potentially multi-
dimensional) value functions. An additional complication stems from the fact that domain W
for the models we are targeting (cf. Sec. 2) is often highly complex—that is, irregularly shaped
and not known a priori (see, e.g., Fernandes and Phelan, (2000) and Broer et al., (2017)). We
therefore describe in Sec. 3.2 how we determine W numerically, whereas in Sec. 3.3 we show
how we approximate value and policy functions on irregularly shaped feasible sets.
3.2 On the iterative approximation of irregularly shaped feasible sets
One major complication we are facing is the fact that the feasible set—that is, the state space
for dynamic adverse selection problems is unknown and potentially of irregular geometry. If
the problem is simple enough, then it can be possible to find an analytical solution. However,





1− β , wθ = maxc∈C
u(c, θ)
1− β , (16)
where wθ and wθ are the lower and upper bounds on promised utilities, respectively. Hence,
in most of the interesting settings, a numerical procedure for approximating the equilibrium
correspondences is required.
One possible way of getting around this issue is to relax the recursive model formulation
(see Eq. (8)) by introducing slack variables on the constraints. Whenever they are nonzero,
one adds a penalty term to the objective function.12 Since the penalty quickly becomes large
12Note that in Appendix A, we will apply this procedure in combination with a highly-tuned adaptive sparse
grid code (Brumm and Scheidegger, (2017)) to verify the method we propose in this paper.
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outside the original feasible region, the actual solution can be found by restricting the relaxed
problem to the feasible set (see, e.g., Judd et al., (2016), and references therein). The advantage
of this procedure is that one can apply highly tuned DP algorithms for hypercubic domains
(see, e.g., Brumm and Scheidegger, (2017)) to solve DI models. The major disadvantage of this
brute-force approach, however, lies in the fact that we need to approximate a computational
domain of which large parts might be infeasible, which in turn can result in a massive waste
of resources (see, e.g., Scheidegger and Bilionis, (2017) for a detailed discussion).
We therefore propose a novel, simulation-based method for determining irregularly shaped
feasible sets. This approach will enable us to concentrate the computational resources where
they are needed and thus be highly efficient (cf., Secs. 3.4 and 4). To this end, we follow the
classical work by APS, who provide set-valued DP techniques for determining feasible sets.
In particular, they show that the feasible sets W (θ) can found by repeatedly applying a set
operator B to an initial “candidate” set until the resulting sequence of sets converges in some






Πν,θ˜(u(cθ˜, θ˜) + βw
+
θ˜,θ˜
) ∀ν ∈ Θ,
u(cθ˜, θ˜) + βw
+
θ˜,θ˜
≥ u(cν , θ˜) + βw+ν,θ˜ ∀θ˜ ∈ Θ, ∀ν ∈ Θ \ {θ˜},
c ∈ [0, c]N ,
w+
θ˜




)ν ∀θ˜ ∈ Θ, ∀ν ∈ Θ
}
, (17)
where X ⊂ RN , and where the operator B(X) contains the constraints of the original problem
stated in Eq. (8). This is a monotone operator—that is to say, B(X) ⊂ X, and its fixed point
will be the feasible set for type θ—namely B(W (θ)) = W (θ).
A numerical implementation of the APS method requires the repeated approximation of
candidate equilibrium value correspondences—that is, a finite collection of sets. To do so, we
propose applying BGMMs13 to construct a classifier to divide the computational domain into
a feasible and an infeasible region. This classification then leads to an outer approximation
that iteratively shrinks toward the feasible set. We terminate the iteration once two successive
classifiers become sufficiently close.




w(1), . . . , w(m)
}
(19)
from a hypercube that contains the feasible set (see Eq. (16)) and fit a BGMM to the points
Xfeas ⊂ Xtest that were deemed to be feasible. We denote the log-likelihood that corresponds
to the BGMM as fθ. Then, we start with the set-valued DP procedure. To do so, we define
f+θ as the log-likelihood from the BGMM in iteration i−1, and denote `+θ to be the smallest log-
likelihood that corresponded to a feasible point—that is, `+θ = min
{
f+θ (w
(j)) | w(j) ∈ (Xfeas)θ
}
,
and generate another m sample points X˜ from inside the updated feasible set via the respective
BGMMs. At a sample point w(k) ∈ X˜ that satisfies f+θ (w(k)) ≥ `+θ within an iteration step i,
13 Mixture of Gaussians are usually used to approximate probability distributions from observed data. Sup-






where the mean vectors µm ∈ RD, the covariance matrices Σm ∈ RD×D, the weights pim with
∑M
m=1 pim = 1,
and the number of components M are fitted to X (see, e.g., Rasmussen, (2000) and Blei and Jordan, (2005)).
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Πν,θ˜(u(cθ˜, θ˜) + βw
+
θ˜,θ˜
) ∀ν ∈ Θ,
u(cθ˜, θ˜) + βw
+
θ˜,θ˜
≥ u(cν , θ˜) + βw+ν,θ˜ ∀θ˜ ∈ Θ, ∀ν ∈ Θ \ {θ˜},





)ν ∀θ˜ ∈ Θ, ∀ν ∈ Θ.
(20)




θ ) of the constrained optimization problem stated above
in Eq. (20) is a smooth relaxation of a classifier that returns 0 for feasible points and a large
negative number for infeasible ones. Furthermore, the constraints are the same ones as those
in the description of the operator B in Eq. (17). The parameter α controls how strict the
relaxation is: the smaller α is, the quicker the objective in Eq. (20) will go to −∞ when
leaving the feasible set.15 If ϕ is above `+θ , we label the point w
(j) as feasible and add it to a
set of feasible points Xfeas. We repeat this until the set Xfeas has sufficiently large cardinality.
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Subsequently, we fit another BGMM to Xfeas to obtain updated values for fθ and `θ. This
procedure is repeated until convergence. Alg. 1 summarizes the detailed steps of the set-valued
DP for determining the feasible sets W (θ) in a more formal way.
Note that it is non-trivial to measure whether the set-valued DP procedure has converged.
To this end, we propose the following procedure: In every iteration step i and every state θ, we
construct a binary classifier Ci,θ (see, e.g., Murphy, (2012)) by labelling infeasible sample points
as 0, and feasible ones by 1, and compute the average L1-error across subsequent candidate
equilibrium correspondences. In practice, this amounts to drawing a uniform sample of points
from a hypercube that contains the feasible set. Subsequently, we use the classifiers from steps
i− 1 and i to find the label of each sample point. We then determine the percentage of points
that get different labels from the classifiers at i− 1 and i, resulting in an approximation of the
error.
The approach presented here has three highly desirable features that yield a substantial
improvement over the previous literature. First, since sampling achieves the approximation
of feasible sets through BGMMs, it does not directly suffer from the curse of dimensionality
and thus can deal with problems involving many types of agents. Second, our scheme of
approximating equilibrium correspondences is independent of solving the DI problem and thus
does not directly add to the computational complexity of solving the actual model. Finally, it
can approximate both convex and non-convex sets.
In contrast, Judd et al., (2003) and Yeltekin et al., (2017), for example, approximate feasible
sets by linear hyperplanes. Their approach is limited to models with discrete states and convex
sets. Moreover, it suffers from the curse of dimensionality. Thus, it is not useful for models
with many types and potentially non-convex, state spaces. Similarly, Abreu and Sannikov,
(2014) provide a method for computing feasible sets in discrete state, two-player games that is
restricted to convex sets and also suffers from the curse of dimensionality. Sleet and Yeltekin,
(2016) provide an extension to Judd et al., (2003) for the case of continuous state variables,
but their method is also restricted to convex sets in low-dimensional spaces.
14In the present form, Eq. (17) is numerically un-tractable due to the constraint w+
θ˜
∈ W (θ˜)—there is no
explicit description of the set W (θ) that is given by inequalities. To circumvent this issue, we get rid of this
constraint by introducing a penalty function p. For any point in the feasible set, this function p will be 0 and
will tend to minus infinity when we leave the boundary of the set (see Eq. (20)).
15In practical applications (see, e.g., Sec. 4.1), we set α = 0.1.
16Note that in our computations (see Sec. 4), |(Xfeas)θ| ≈ 1, 000 led to satisfactory results.
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Data: For all θ: initial set of points {w(1), . . . , w(m)}, uniformly drawn from a domain
that contains the feasible set (see Eq. (16)). Approximation accuracy ¯.
Result: The approximate feasible sets W (θ), determined by the log-likelihood fθ and
cut-off `θ that define the classifier Cθ, where Cθ(w
(j)) = 1 iff fθ(w
(j)) ≥ `θ.
Fit BGMM to Xfeas for all θ to get fθ and `θ = min
{
fθ(w





while  > ¯ do
for θ ∈ Θ do
Generate m sample points X˜ from the most recent “candidate” feasible set via
last iteration’s BGMM and set X = {w(k) ∈ X˜ : f+θ (x) ≥ `+θ }.
Set n = |X|.
Set (Xfeas)θ = ∅.
while |(Xfeas)θ| < n do
Solve optimization problem given by Eq. (20) at point w(k) ∈ X and get
objective ϕ.
if ϕ ≥ `+θ then
(Xfeas)θ = (Xfeas)θ ∪ {w(j)}.
end
end
Fit a BGMM to (Xfeas)θ to obtain fθ and lθ = min
{






Compute the average L1-error .
end
Algorithm 1: Overview of the critical steps for computing the equilibrium correspondences.
Once the set-valued DP procedure for finding the equilibrium correspondences has con-
verged, we can use the equilibrium BGMMs to generate training data from within these feasible
sets W (θ) to train the GPs (see Secs. 3.3 and 3.4). This focuses the computational resources
where needed. Note that for the same reasons as in Eq. (20), we have to restate the original
recursive problem (see Eq. (8)) and replace the constraints on the future utility promises with
a penalty F , resulting in




Πθ,θ˜(v(cθ˜, θ˜) + βV
+(w+
θ˜
, θ˜)) + F (w+
θ˜




Πν,θ˜(u(cθ˜, θ˜) + βw
+
θ˜,θ˜
) ∀ν ∈ Θ,
u(cθ˜, θ˜) + βw
+
θ˜,θ˜
≥ u(cν , θ˜) + βw+ν,θ˜ ∀θ˜ ∈ Θ, ∀ν ∈ Θ \ {θ˜},





)ν ∀θ˜ ∈ Θ, ∀ν ∈ Θ,
where F is the objective function from the constrained optimization problem stated in Eq. (20).
It is easy to see that this penalty will be close to zero for fθ ≥ `θ, but will diverge to −∞ for
fθ < `θ. Moreover, it is smooth. Hence, we can easily use it in the optimization problem.
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3.3 Gaussian process regression
In the following, we provide a very brief introduction to GPR based on Rasmussen and
Williams, (2005) and Scheidegger and Bilionis, (2017), with references therein. GPR is a
nonparametric regression method from supervised machine learning, and addresses the prob-
lem of learning input–output mappings from observed data—the so-called training set. Ob-
servations can for example stem from a computer code (as in our case) or from empiri-
cal experiments. More abstractly, given a data set D = {(x(i), t(i)) |i = 1, ..., N} consist-
ing of N input vectors x(i) ∈ W ⊂ Rdx and corresponding, potentially noisy, observations
t(i) = V (x(i)) + ,  ∼ N (0, σ2 ), we want to deduce a model of the unknown function V that
generated the data such that we then can make predictions for new inputs x∗ that we have not
seen in the training set. In the literature, the matrix
X =
{
x(1), . . . ,x(N)
}
(22)
is commonly referred to as training inputs, whereas
t =
{
t(1), . . . , t(N)
}
(23)
is the vector of the corresponding training targets (observations). To enable predictions based
on information contained in D, we must make assumptions about the characteristics of the
underlying functions, as GPR is a Bayesian regression method. We start by defining a prob-
ability measure on the function space, where V (·) lives corresponding to our beliefs. Before
seeing any data, we model our state of knowledge about V (·) by assigning a GP prior to it.
We say that V (·) is a GP with mean function m(·;φ) and covariance function k(·, ·;φ), and
write
V (·)|φ ∼ GP(V (·)|m(·;φ), k(·, ·;φ)), (24)
where φ ∈ Θ ⊂ Rdθ and dθ ∈ N are the so-called hyper-parameters of the model. The prior
beliefs about the response are reflected in our choice of the mean and covariance functions. The
prior mean function is required to model any general trends of the response surface and can
have any functional form.17 The covariance function, also known as the covariance kernel, is
the most important part of GPR: it defines a measure of similarity on the input space. That is
to say, given two input points, their covariance models how close we expect the corresponding
outputs to be. A valid choice for a covariance function must be positive semi-definite and
symmetric. A very popular covariance function is the square exponential (SE)
kSE(x,x










where φ = {s, `1, . . . , `D}, with s > 0 being the variability of the latent function V , and `i > 0
the characteristic lengthscale of the i-th input.18 We will use the SE kernel in all our numerical
experiments below (see Sec. 4).













17We set the prior mean to 0 throughout this paper.
18Note that the hyper-parameters of the covariance function are typically estimated by maximizing the
likelihood, a topic that is beyond the scope of the present work. For more details, see Scheidegger and Bilionis,
(2017), and references therein.
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In particular, V is distributed as
V|X,φ ∼ N (V|m,K) , (27)
where N (·|m,K) is the PDF of a multivariate Gaussian random variable with m := m(X;φ) ∈
RN being the mean function evaluated at all points in X, and K ∈ RN×N is the covariance
matrix with Kij = k(x
(i),x(j);φ) (see, e.g., Eq. (25)).
In the Bayesian framework we are operating in, we have to model explicitly the measurement
process that gives rise to the observations t. We do so by assuming that measurements are






, sn ∼ N
(
t(i)
∣∣∣V (x(i)) , s2n) , (28)
where sn > 0 is an additional hyper-parameter that must be determined from the training
targets. Using the independence of the observations, we get
t|V, sn ∼ N
(
t
∣∣V, s2nIN) . (29)
In direct consequence, the likelihood of the observations is, given the inputs,
t|X,φ, sn ∼ N
(
t
∣∣m,K + s2nIN) . (30)
Bayes’s rule combines the prior GP (see Eq. (24)) with the likelihood (see Eq. (30)) and yields
the posterior GP
V (·)|X, t,φ, sn ∼ GP
(
V (·)
∣∣∣m˜(·), k˜(·, ·)) , (31)
where the posterior mean and covariance functions are given by






k˜(x,x′) := k˜(x,x′;φ, sn)
= k(x,x′;φ)−K(x,X;φ) (K + s2nIN)−1 K(X,x;φ), (33)
respectively. In order to carry out interpolation tasks when performing VFI (see Secs. 3.4
and 4), one has to operate with the predictive (marginal) distribution of the function value
V (x∗) for a single test input x∗ conditional on the hyper-parameters φ and sn—namely,
V (x∗)|X, t,φ, sn ∼ N (V (x∗)|m˜(x∗), σ˜(x∗)) , (34)
where m˜(x∗) = m˜(x∗;φ) is the predictive mean given by Eq. (32), and σ˜2(x∗) := k˜(x∗,x∗;φ, sn)
is the predictive variance. The predictive mean can be used as a point-wise surrogate of the
response surface—that is, the interpolation value.
3.4 A solution algorithm for dynamic incentive problems
Given the DP procedure described in Sec. 3.1 (see Eqs. (13) and (14)), we now outline how
to solve a dynamic adverse selection model (cf. Sec. 2) recursively by combining the pre-
computation of feasible sets with VFI and GPR.
The GP VFI algorithm that we propose for computing the optimal decision rules proceeds
as follows: For every discrete state present in the model (that is, every individual type θ), we
first determine the static—that is, time-invariant feasible set W (θ) (see Sec. 3.2) by BGMMs,
from which we then later can sample training inputs for the GPR. Next, we make an initial
guess for a value function V0(·, ·) from which we can instantiate the VFI procedure. Then,
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Data: Initial guess V0(·, ·) for the value function of every type θ. Approximation
accuracy ¯.
Result: The M (approximate) equilibrium policy functions pi∗(·, ·) and the
corresponding value functions V ∗(·, ·) for every type θ ∈ Θ, where |Θ| = D.
Determine for every type θ the respective feasible set W (θ) by iterating on Eq. (20).
Set iteration step j = 0.
while  > ¯ do
for θj+1 ∈ Θ do
Generate n training inputs X = {xj+1i : 1 ≤ i ≤ nj+1} ∈W (θ).
for xj+1i ∈ X do
Evaluate the Bellman operator T (Vj)(x
j+1
i ) (see. Eq. (21)).




Set t = {ti : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
Given {X, t}, learn the surrogate V j+1.
Calculate (an approximation for) the error, e.g.: θ = ‖Vj+1 − Vj‖2.
end
Set j = j + 1.  = max(θ1 , ..., θD )
end
τ = j − 1
V ∗(·, ·) = Vτ (·, ·).
pi∗(·, ·) = {pi1(·, ·), · · · , piM (·, ·)}.
Algorithm 2: Overview of the critical steps of the VFI algorithm that operates on equilib-
rium correspondences W (·).
we generate at every iteration step j + 1 of the VFI and for every discrete state θ a set of
nj+1 training inputs from within the feasible set W (θ)–namely, xj+11:n , on which we evaluate
the Bellman operator (see Eqs. 13 and 21)19
tj+11:nj+1 = {tj+11 , . . . , tj+1nj+1}, (35)
where
tj+1i = T (Vj)(x
j+1, θj+1). (36)
We use this training data to learn the surrogate of the updated value function for type θ.
Note that every individual evaluation of the Bellman operator is carried out by using the
predictive mean of Vj(·, ·) as the interpolator. The VFI procedure is continued until numerical
convergence is reached (cf. Eq. (15)). Alg. 2 summarizes the detailed steps of the GP VFI
on multidimensional, irregularly shaped feasible sets W (θ) in a more formal way. Note that
at convergence, one can not only learn the approximate value functions V ∗(·, ·) = Vτ (·, ·) but
also, if desired, the equilibrium policy functions pi∗(·, ·), using an individual GP per policy.
Note that one of the defining features of GPR is that it is a grid-free method of constructing
a surrogate—that is, it allows the modeler to closely steer the content of the training set {X, t}
(see Sec. 3.3) and thus to construct surrogates on irregularly shaped geometries. This has two
significant practical advantages when addressing DI models numerically. First, if an individual
19At every single training point, the individual optimization problems—given by Eq. (21) in our application—
are solved with Ipopt (see Waechter and Biegler, (2006)), which is a high-quality open-source software for solving
nonlinear programs (http://www.coin-or.org/Ipopt/).
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optimization problem at some particular point xi does not converge, one does not need to deal
with tuning the optimizer until it converges at this location of the state space. Instead, this
training input (and the corresponding, nonsensical training target) can be discarded—that is
to say, it is not added to the training set. This is in stark contrast to grid-based methods
such as “Smolyak” (see, e.g., Krueger and Kubler, (2004) and Judd et al., (2014)) or “adaptive
sparse grids” (see, e.g., Brumm and Scheidegger, (2017) and Brumm et al., (2015)), where
the construction of the surrogate breaks down if not every optimization problem required by
the algorithm can be solved. Second, computing solutions solely on a domain of relevance—
that is, W (θ), allows one to carry out VFI on complex, high-dimensional geometries without
suffering from massive inefficiencies, as the computational resources are concentrated where
needed. Particularly in high-dimensional settings, this can potentially speed up the time-
to-solution process by orders of magnitude, as the feasible set might have a negligibly small
volume compared to the computational domain that standard approximation methods require
(see Scheidegger and Bilionis, (2017) for more details). Finally, note that to solve “large”
problems in a reasonably short time, we make use of parallel computation. For the details of
the parallelization, see Scheidegger and Bilionis, (2017).
4 Numerical experiments
To demonstrate the broad applicability and versatility of the framework introduced in this
paper, we solve three distinct versions of the dynamic adverse selection environment outlined in
Sec. 2. In Sec. 4.1, we solve the example by Fernandes and Phelan, (2000) as a basic verification
test for our method. In Sec. 4.2, we extend this model to alternative preferences. Third, we
solve in Sec. 4.3 the baseline model by Fernandes and Phelan, (2000) for increasingly many
types θ to show that we can handle dynamic adverse selection problems with state spaces of
irregular geometry and a dimensionality larger than two, which is the standard in the previous
literature.
4.1 Baseline model
To gain a systematic understanding of how our framework behaves in real applications, we
apply it to a privately observed endowment model by Fernandes and Phelan, (2000), for which
numerical solutions are known. First, we briefly summarize the model and its parameterization.
Second, we report on the performance of our proposed set-valued DP method. Finally, we
discuss the solution to the DI problem that was obtained by performing VFI on the pre-
computed, irregularly shaped state spaces.
We consider an environment that consists of a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse agent.




where c is restricted to the finite range [c, c]. There are two types in the model—namely a
“low” (state 1) and “high” (state 2) one. The respective endowments are given by hlow and
hhigh. The agent receives a shock in each period and then reports it to the principal. The
agent learns his private type in each period and then reports it to the principal. Subsequently,
the principal then transfers consumption to agent dependent on what the agent reported (see
Fig. 1). Since the problem depends on the full history, we use the recursive reformulation that
we introduced in Theorem 3. The resulting state space of promised utilities in this model is
2-dimensional. Furthermore, we follow Fernandes and Phelan, (2000) and assume that the






[c, c] [0, 1]
Table 1: Parameterization of the privately observed endowment model by Fernandes and Phe-
lan, (2000).
than the lower type can afford, then we have to prevent the agent from over-reporting his type
(see Sec. 2). The Markov process governing the endowments in the model specification here
is such that the agent has a 90 percent chance of receiving the endowment he received in the
previous period. The remaining parametrization is reported in Tab. 1.
In Fig. 2, we display approximations of the equilibrium value correspondences for the low
state at various iteration steps when performing set-valued DP with BGMMs (see Alg. 1).
In particular, we show the candidate points that were generated from within the current ap-
proximation of the feasible set as well as the sample points that are deemed feasible in the
respective APS iteration step. This sequence of figures indicates that our proposed method—
that is, to merge the set-valued DP methods with BGMMs, leads to converging results. In
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Feasible points - state 1
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Figure 2: The above four panels display the convergence of the (candidate) feasible set for
state 1 as a function of w1 and w2 (see Alg. 1). The top-left panel shows the first step in the
set-valued DP procedure; the top-right shows step 2. The lower-left panel is a result from step
15, and the lower-right is based on iteration 35.
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Fig. 3, we show the feasible sets for both the low and the high state once the set-valued DP
iteration has converged—that is, after about 50 iteration steps, where the approximation error
for the sets reaches O(10−3) percent.20 Having (approximately) determined the equilibrium
w 1

















Figure 3: The left panel shows the approximate feasible set for the low state at convergence as
a function of w1 and w2. The right panel shows the respective set for the high state.
value correspondences for the two states, we turn our attention now to the recursive solution
of the model. Fig. 4 depicts the decreasing, aggregated L1- and L2-errors (see Eq. (15)) for the
value functions when performing VFI with GPs on the feasible sets (see Alg. 2). The graph
indicates that our proposed solution framework—that is, the combination of APS, BGMMs,
and GPR—can successfully and efficiently solve DI problems.21 In Fig. 5, we show the value
functions for the low and high states at convergence.
To gain some economic insights into the optimal contracts computed, we now carry out a
collection of simulations and impulse–response experiments. In the left panel of Fig. 6, we show
simulation patterns for the principal’s optimal value in the low (V1) and high (V2) states. The
simulation was launched from the optimal value in the promised utility space. Furthermore,
we kept the shocks constant in the respective state. We find that in the low state, the optimal
value is increasing, whereas in the high state, the value remains constant. Analogously, the
right panel of Fig. 6 displays the utility promise in state i to type i. Fig. 7 displays the
corresponding utility transfer u in state i to type i. The left and right panels of Fig. 8 depict
the simulation paths within the respective feasible sets. In the low state, we almost start at
the steady state, whereas in the high state, we traverse almost the entire set. The reason for
this is that there is no incentive constraint for the low type (cf. footnote 3 in Fernandes and
Phelan, (2000)).
Next, we show several impulse–response experiments on the equilibrium policies. Starting
from the steady state, we induce the complementary state, and then return to the original one.
The left panel of Fig. 9 displays how the promised utility in the low state reacts to this shock,
whereas the right panel shows the same for the utility transfer. We can see that the perturbed
quantities quickly return to the steady state, since the discount factor β = 0.9 is relatively
small (see Tab. 1). Fig. 10 shows what happens if we change the type for one period, while
being in the steady state. As shown in this figure, the utility promises return after a few steps
back to the steady state for both the low and high types.
Summarizing, we note that the results shown in this section replicate those reported in Fer-
20We cross-validate the findings here by an alternative method that is based on adaptive sparse grids. The
affirmative results are summarized in Appendix A.
21In this application, generating 100 observations per state and iteration step from the approximate equilib-
rium correspondences to train the GPs led to satisfactory results.
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Figure 4: Aggregated, decreasing L1- and L2-errors for the 2-dimensional DI model that was
solved by training GP surrogates with 100 observations that were generated from within the









































Figure 5: Left panel—value function of the low state (V1) as a function of w1 and w2. Right
panel—value function of the high state (V2) as a function of w1 and w2. In both panels, we
evaluated the respective value functions at 180 equally spaced points for illustrative purposes.
nandes and Phelan, (2000).
4.2 Alternative preferences
To show that our framework is capable of operating on a broad variety of preferences, we turn
our attention now to a model specification that is slightly different to the one considered in
Sec. 4.1. In particular, the risk-averse agent’s utility over consumption is now given by
u(c) =
(c+ c)1−γ
1− γ . (38)
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Figure 6: Left panel—optimal value at simulation step t in states 1 (V1) and 2 (V2). Right
panel—promised utility in the low (w1) and high states (w2) as a function of the simulation
step t.
t












Figure 7: Utility transfer u in states 1 (u1) and 2 (u2) to type 1 and 2 at simulation step t.
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10 Feasible set - state 2
Simulated states
Steady state
Figure 8: Left panel—simulation path in the feasible set for the low state, state 1. Right
panel—the same, for the high state, state 2.
As a concrete example, we choose γ = 2. Moreover, to ensure that the lower bound on utility
at c = 0 is 0, we set
































Figure 9: Left panel—behavior of promised utility w1 if we change the state from 1 to 2 for one
period while being in the steady state. Right panel—similar to the left panel but for utility
transfer u1. Note that we induce state 2 at t = −1.
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Figure 10: Path of the utility promises after a shock to the steady state has occurred, depicted
in the left panel for state 1 and in the right panel for state 2. In both panels, the steady state
as well as the utility promises right after the shock are labeled by arrows.
with c = 1. We keep all other parameters as listed in Tab. 1. Since the upper bound on
consumption in this example is 1, the upper bound on utility in turn is given by
u(1)/(1− β) = 0.5/0.1 = 5. (40)
In Fig. 11, we show approximations for the feasible sets for both the low and the high state
once the set-valued DP iteration with BGMMs has converged (see Alg. 1). Comparing Fig. 11
with Fig. 3—that is, the feasible sets for the two respective utility functions, we can see
that the sets for both the low and high types are of similar shape, whereas the ranges are
substantially different: the preferences in this example yield substantially smaller equilibrium
value correspondences.
As in Sec. 4.1, we now carry out simulations and impulse–response experiments to gain
insights into the optimal contracts we compute in this section. The simulations were again
launched from the optimal value in the promised utility space. Furthermore, we kept the
shocks constant in the respective state.
The left and the right panels of Fig. 12 show the simulation path within the respective
equilibrium value correspondences. In line with Sec. 4.1, we find that in the low state we
20
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Figure 11: The left panel shows the approximate feasible set for the low state at convergence
as a function of w1 and w2. The right panel shows the respective set for the high state.
almost start at the steady state, whereas in the high state we traverse a large fraction of the
feasible set. The reason for this is again that in the present model setting, there is no incentive
constraint for the low type (cf. footnote 3 in Fernandes and Phelan, 2000). Next, we show
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Simulated states
Steady state
Figure 12: Left panel—simulation path in the feasible set for the low state, state 1. Right
panel—the same, for the high state, state 2.
impulse–response experiments on the equilibrium policies. Starting from the steady state, we
induce the complementary state, and then return to the original one. In Fig. 13, we can see
that the perturbed quantities quickly return to the steady state both for the low and the high
types. The reason for this is that the discount factor β = 0.9 is relatively small (see Tab. 1).
4.3 Many types
In this section, we demonstrate the (dimensional) scalability of our method. To do so, we
exapand the baseline model (see Sec. 4) to three types, a “low” (state 1), a “middle” (state
2) and a “high” (state 3) one. An agent’s endowment is either hlow = 0.3, hmiddle = 0.6 or
hhigh = 0.9. Moreover, we choose the transition probabilities across the different types (see
21
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Figure 13: Path of the utility promises after a shock to the steady state has occurred, depicted
in the left panel for state 1 and in the right panel for state 2. In both panels, the steady state




















































Figure 14: The left panel shows the approximate feasible set W (θ1) as a function of w1, w2,
and w3. The central panel displays W (θ2) as a function of the promised utilities. The right
panel finally depicts the approximate equilibrium correspondence W (θ3).
Theorem 3) to be
Πθ,θ˜ =
0.7 0.3 0.00.2 0.5 0.3
0.0 0.4 0.6
 . (41)
The choice of the Markov chain given by Eq. (41) is based on the following reasoning: Let us
assume that an agent works in a firm with a rigid hierarchy. He can be promoted, demoted,
or stay in his rank. If the agent moves inside the company’s hierarchy, it can only happen one
level at a time. Moreover, it is also more likely that the agent is on a lower rung than it is for
him to be of a hight type. The set discount factor to β = 0.96. All other settings are kept as
stated in Sec. 4.
The pre-computed equilibrium value correspondences for the three types θ1, θ2 and θ3 are
depicted in Fig. 14. Their three-dimensional geometry strongly resembles the one of a airplane
wing.
[TBD: discussion of results.]
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce a scalable and flexible framework for solving infinite-horizon, dis-
crete time DI problems with hidden states and of unprecedented complexity. Addressing such
dynamic adverse selection models is a formidable task, since two major computational bottle-
necks create difficulties in the solution process. Issue one is related to the fact that the feasible
sets of utility promises are not known in advance and have to be determined numerically. In
most of the interesting economic applications, such sets have a non-hypercubic geometry and
might even be non-convex. Issue two results from solving the dynamic adverse selection prob-
lem with VFI. To do so, we need to repeatedly approximate and evaluate high-dimensional
functions at arbitrary coordinates within the domain of interest—that is, the feasible sets.
We address the computation of the equilibrium value correspondences, combining the set-
valued dynamic programming techniques by APS with BGMMs. For the VFI, we use a mas-
sively parallel algorithm that applies GP machine learning in every iteration step to approxi-
mate the value functions on the pre-computed, time-invariant feasible sets.
Our approach provides several desirable features that yield a substantial improvement
over the previous literature. First, since sampling achieves the approximation of feasible sets
through BGMMs, it does not directly suffer from the curse of dimensionality and thus can
deal with problems involving many types of agents. Second, our scheme of approximating
equilibrium value correspondences is independent of solving the DI problem, and thus does
not directly add to the computational complexity of solving the actual model. Third, it can
approximate both convex and non-convex sets. Moreover, the equilibrium BGMMs can be used
to generate sample data from within the approximate equilibrium value correspondences. This
directly plays to the strength of GPR: a form of supervised machine learning that can—given
a training set that is generated from within the feasible region—be used to approximate and
interpolate functions on irregularly shaped state spaces. Furthermore, since the construction of
GP surrogates is achieved by sampling from a domain of interest such as a feasible set, they can
handle the curse of dimensionality to some extent. Thus, our proposed method—that is, using
APS and BGMMs in conjunction with GPs—has the potential of handling highly complex DI
models at a relatively low computational cost, as it focuses the resources where needed.
To demonstrate the capabilities of our framework, we compute solutions for models of
repeated agency with history dependence, varying preferences, and increasingly many types.
It is clear that while the focus of the work presented lies in solving dynamic adverse selection
problems, the method proposed here has a far broader scope: it can also be applied, for
example, to moral hazard problems, mechanism design, or to dynamic games, where one of the
significant difficulties also lies in finding the equilibrium sets.
This all suggests that our framework will enable researchers to think of DI problems of
greater richness than was possible prior to this work, as they no longer need to substantially
restrict their modeling choices from the outset.
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A Approximating feasible sets with adaptive sparse grids
To verify the functionality of the framework proposed in this paper for determining the
equilibrium correspondences (see Sec. 3.2), we cross-validate it by applying adaptive sparse
grids (see, e.g., Brumm and Scheidegger, (2017)). In particular, we solve—as briefly men-
tioned in Sec. 3.2—an auxiliary problem of Eq. (17) for which we know the true solution on
the feasible set. More precisely, we relax the feasibility via a penalty function such that the
resulting value function will be zero on the feasible set and less otherwise. Strictly speaking,
we are looking for the fixed point of the following dynamic program:

















s.t. wν = ξν +
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θ˜∈Θ
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and where Eq. (43) is a smooth approximation of the norm ‖ · ‖1. F (·, ·) is approximated by
piecewise linear basis functions on an adaptive sparse grid. Eq. (42) is an ordinary DP problem
with a fixed point and therefore can be solved by VFI. We know that for all feasible w, the








—that is to say, less than or equal to zero. Moreover, any feasible point
will have an optimal value of zero, since there we will not need to relax the bounds on the
equality constraints. Thus, the resulting value function has to be zero for feasible values and
less than zero otherwise (for more details, see Judd et al., (2016)). Once the VFI for Eq. (42)
has converged, we can go on and use a scaled version of F (·, ·) as a penalty for the dynamic
incentive problem.
We now recompute the test case outlined in Sec. 4.1. In Fig. 15, we display the equilibrium
correspondences for the low and high states, computed by applying adaptive sparse grids.
Comparing Fig. 15 to Fig. 3, it becomes apparent that the two methods yield similar results
and thus confirm each other.
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Figure 15: The left panel shows the approximate equilibrium correspondences for the low state
as a function of w1 and w2, whereas the right panel shows the respective set for the high
state. Both feasible sets were computed by applying adaptive sparse grids and set-valued DP
(see Eq. (42)).
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